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BIODIVERSITY FEDERALISM
A. DAN TARLOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY BIODIVERSIrY PROTECTION IS A HARD
FEDERALISM PROBLEM
Environmental protection policy is subdividing into two
branches: risk minimization and biodiversity protection.' Risk reduc-
tion is a difficult, if problematic, objective to accomplish because we
have no reliable way to measure the magnitude of the risks that we are
trying to minimize.' However, this objective has been widely accepted
as a legitimate public policy for the past twenty-five years. Risk preven-
tion is consistent with the Western legal tradition because it seeks to
prevent or redress human injury.' Biodiversity protection on the
* A.B., 1962; LL.B., 1965, Stanford University; Associate Dean for Faculty and Profes-
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Marshall T. Ewell Research Fund in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and
Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALEJ. ON REG. 369 (1993) (exploring the reasons
that "risk reduction" has become the leading environmental regulatory objective and the
limits of this paradigm when one moves from cancer prevention to the maintenance of
biodiversity).
The division is not of course an absolute one. All environmental management is sci-
ence-based, see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, and biodiversity is threatened by
the continued release of toxic pollutants into the air, water, and land. The two branches of
environmental protection were linked in Rachel Carson's influential early brief against
pesticides, Silent Spring See infra notes 52-53. Nonetheless, the significant differences be-
tween human health protection and natural resources management in promoting human
and nonhuman values justify the division as an organizing principle for environmental law.
2. See Hornstein, supra note 1, at 378-79 (discussing the failure to include various fac-
tors in risk assessment).
3. The acceptance of risk prevention can be seen in the occasional incorporation of
probabilistic concepts of risk into tort law. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
863 P.2d 795, 818 (Cal. 1993) (ruling that recognition of fear of cancer as a result of
exposure to toxic substances divorced from immediate "physical" injury is a basis for tort
liability in limited circumstances); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824,
836-37 (I11. 1981) (enjoining the operation of a hazardous waste landfill to prevent "highly
probable . . . substantial injury"). In contrast, biodiversity protection remains positive or
statutory law. See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law But Not Environmental Protection, in
NATURAL RESOURCES POLICe AND LAw: TRENnS AND DIRECTIONS 172-75 (L.J. MacDonnell &
Sarah F. Bates eds., 1993) (discussing sources of biodiversity protection laws). A leading
environmental historian has argued that environmental protection represents the logical
progression of the Western concern for human dignity. See RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS
OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 3-12 (1989). This theory is fundamen-
tally flawed. The prevailing Western tradition is one of negative rather than positive polit-
ical rights and duties, but environmentalism seeks to impose positive duties on
governments and individuals to act. See generally CAss SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLU-
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other hand presents much more difficult problems of legitimacy and
implementation within this tradition because it partially collapses the
ethical dichotomy between humans and nature.4 As a result of scien-
tific and popular alarm over species declines, the maintenance of bio-
logical diversity has rapidly emerged as a primary objective of both
international5 and United States environmental law,6 because it pro-
vides a reasonably coherent and general principle of natural resources
management.7 However, the achievement of this objective remains
highly contingent because biodiversity protection strategies pose
greater challenges to existing legal institutions as compared with the
reduction of air, water and land pollution risks. At bottom, the
achievement of effective biodiversity protection is difficult because the
very idea of biodiversity protection is antithetical to the Western idea
of human economic progress through science, technology and the en-
couragement of individual initiative.' These challenges vividly mani-
fest themselves in the efforts to fit biodiversity protection into a
federal system which seeks to promote values associated with eco-
nomic progress.
This Article explores ongoing efforts to implement biodiversity
protection programs within the United States federal system, although
the problems are the same in analogous political systems such as Aus-
tralia and Canada. Federalism problems are a subset of the much no-
ticed fragmentation of biodiversity protection efforts both in the
United States and other countries. 9
TION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). Professor Sunstein argues that public
rights must be measured against a constitutional or common law background, but con-
cludes that the background for environmental rights is neutral so that legislatures can
apply benefit-cost analyses in defining legislative entitlements.
4. SeeJOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974) (exploring the West-
ern legacy that nature exists to benefit mankind).
5. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, concluded at Rio deJaneiroJune 5, 1992, entered into, December 29,
1993, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
6. See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 269-304 (1991) (providing an overview of United States biodiversity
law).
7. See id. at 269-83 (discussing the appeal for the preservation of biological diversity).
8. See generally BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPROVEMENT AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT (1994) (exploring the link between the
triumph of scientific objectivity and the loss of biodiversity due to the economic and envi-
ronmental policies of the World Bank since World War II).
9. In the United States, for example, efforts to develop a Greater Yellowstone Ecosys-
tem to provide effective regional protection of biodiversity, which the world-prototype Yel-
lowstone National Park by itself cannot accomplish, have been frustrated largely because of
inter-jurisdictional conflicts. See Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Pub-
lic Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 933-42
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Biodiversity protection programs reflect the tension between the
universality of the abstract justifications for the exercise of national
power to promote this objective, and the inherently local or site-spe-
cific nature of the problems. Universal biodiversity protection goals
may be easily articulated, but they cannot be applied across the board.
The chief threat to biodiversity protection is habitat loss." Thus, the
(1989) (discussing obstacles to establishing ecosystem boundaries in the Yellowstone re-
gion). Although the largest land area in the functional ecosystem is Yellowstone National
Park, the Park Service's mandate to preserve the park for future generations has, neverthe-
less, been interpreted to allow intense visitor development. See id. at 924 n.2 (noting the
common theme among the mandates for "preserved" lands is to preserve them in their
pristine state). To complicate matters, adjacent forest service lands are managed under an
older, multiple-use mandate which encourages commodity production. Id. at 968. Newer
forest management legislation requires that the Forest Service identify environmentally
sensitive areas, but destructive clear-cutting continues to degrade the surrounding forest
system. See id. at 972-75 (discussing problems with timber harvesting). The result is that
ecosystem planning remains subject to high levels of administrative discretion and, thus,
multiple-constituency pressure. SeeJIM ROBRINS, LAST REFUGE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL SHOW-
DOWN IN YELLOWSrONE AND THE AMERICAN WEST 101-32 (1993) (discussing the constituency
pressures in the context of logging at Yellowstone); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary
Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 296-303 (1994)
(discussing the history of public land policy in the United States).
The problems are similar in Australia and Canada, although their federalism frame-
work is different. See generally Colin Rankin & Michael M'Gonigle, Legislation for Biological
Diversity: A Review and Proposal for British Columbia, 25 U. BRITISH COLUMBIA L REV. 277, 294
(1991) (discussing the Australian and Canadian federal legislative regimes that delegate
power to provincial governments). The federal or national governments in both countries
have extensive power to manage federal lands for biodiversity, but these federal systems
face an additional problem. In general, central governments have established the most
effective environmental protection regimes, but regulatory power and the resource base
are shared more equally between these national and state or provincial governments. See
id. (discussing the power over environmental matters held by the British Columbian gov-
ernment). In Australia, for example, a major source of Commonwealth constitutional
power to protect biodiversity is the external affairs power. Thus, Commonwealth action
must be tied to the implementation of an international obligation. See Commonwealth v.
Tasmania, 46 A.L.R. 625 (1983). Nonetheless, given Australia's weak national government
tradition, when power is exercised, it falls short of the full constitutional authority. For
example, Australia enacted a Commonwealth Endangered Species Protection Act in 1992
with a listing process, but it covers Commonwealth areas which equal only 0.2% of the
country. SeeJohn Bradsen, The "Green Issues": Biodiversity Conservation in Australia, in ErV-
RONMENTAL OUTLOOC LAW AND PoLIcv (B. Boer et al. eds., 1994); Nicolee Dixon, Protec-
tion of Endangered Species-How Will Australia Cope, 11 ENVTL. & PLANNING L.J. 6 (1994).
The Commonwealth relies on cooperative efforts with the states. See id. at 17-26 for a
survey of recent state nature conservation legislation, but no state has an effective overall
ecosystem program. See Andrew H.H. Kelly, Protecting Endangered Fauna in NSW. Informed
Habitat Destruction, 1 AusTRALIAN J. NAT RESOURcEs L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 1995) (cri-
tique of New South Wales endangered species legislation because it is limited to assessment
of impacts on selected higher order species and does not protect total ecosystems); see also
A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Protection in the Pacific Rim: The Land Use Challenge, 4 ASIA PAC.
LJ. (forthcoming Winter 1995).
10. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERsrrY OF LIFE 243-80 (1992).
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objective of any protection program is habitat conservation and resto-
ration,"' rather than the regulation of industrial activities through the
application of standard technology. As Edward 0. Wilson has written,
"[t] he primary tactic in conservation must be to locate the world's hot
spots and to protect the entire environment they contain." 2 In short,
biodiversity protection requires strong land-use regulation and incen-
tive schemes to induce the dedication of protected habitat, both of
which are among the most difficult natural resources management or
environmental objectives to achieve in a federal system.
None of the dominant models of federalism are suited to protect
biodiversity or to describe the protection experiments underway. In
fact, federalism principles are as likely to frustrate biodiversity protec-
tion as to promote it for three principal reasons. First, federalism is
premised on the search for the optimum exclusive regulatory balance,
and this can often frustrate necessary intergovernmental cooperation.
Second, the maintenance of national protection floors supplemented
by states is unworkable because in contrast to air and water pollution
control,1 3 there are no uniform standards that one can realistically
apply to biodiversity in states as different as Alaska, Arizona and Flor-
ida. Third, the national government must rely on powers, primarily
land-use controls and water-rights administration, that are tradition-
ally and firmly lodged within state and local governments.
This misfit is critically important to biodiversity protection be-
cause the main threat to achieving this objective is local resistance that
may undermine national efforts.' 4 This statement simply reflects the
11. The restoration of degraded ecosystem is becoming an important biodiversity pro-
tection strategy because there is less undisturbed habitat to preserve. See COMMITTEE ON
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF
AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1992) [hereinafter COM-
MITTEE ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS]. The idea of restoration has been challenged by many
students of environmental ethics because only areas that have not been subjected to
human intervention are authentic "nature." See generally C. Mark Cowell, Ecological Restora-
tion and Environmental Ethics, 15 ENvrL. ETHICS 19 (1993) (discussing human interaction
aspects of biodiversity protection).
12. WILSON, supra note 10, at 336. For an interesting historical survey that explores the
roots of the endless destruction of habitat, see CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE
WORLD (1991).
13. The need for uniform standards is greatly debated within environmental law. See
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System-and
Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REv. 1226 (1995) (arguing for non-uniform federal environmen-
tal standards); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1227-33
(1992) (discussing the practice of some states that employ stricter environmental regula-
tions than the federal government).
14. For a review of some of the celebrated local objections to federal mandates because
of the high costs of protection, see Is the Endangered Species Act in Danger?, 267 SCIENCE 1256
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long standing tension between national articulation of resource man-
agement goals and local efforts to promote unrestricted access to nat-
ural resources for economic exploitation. Although the tradition of
local resistance to national conservation is well into its second century,
the current manifestation of this tension is the wise-use movement
which seeks to tie all regulation to statutory compensation in excess of
that required under federal or state constitutional law. 5 Innovative
state and local attempts to promote biodiversity are driven by the
need to comply with federal mandates, primarily the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. But, despite the constitutional power of the national govern-
ment to achieve this objective, 6 federal mandates are perceived as
intrusions on state and local sovereignty.17
Federalism exacerbates the tension between local and national
"prerogatives" because the essence of a federal system is the division
of power between the national sovereign and lesser sovereign units.
This division either is based on a constitutional scheme of power frag-
mentation or is justified as a means to match problems with compe-
tent jurisdictions. 8 In our constitutional system, the emphasis has
been on the establishment of negative liberties and on the location of
regulatory competence. The quasi-constitutional jurisprudence of the
European Court ofJustice,"9 for example, focuses only on the former,
(1995), and WALLACE KAUFMAN, No TURNING BAcKd DISMANTLING THE FANTASIES OF ENvi-
RONMENTAL THINKING (1994). But see Revesz, supra note 13, at 1211-12 (discussing then
rejecting this theory).
15. See WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLIONS
225-32 (1990) (discussing movements to return land regulation to the states).
16. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-
93 (1981) (holding that the commerce power extends to national regulation of private
land-use for environmental purposes).
17. SeeJ.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regu-
lating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Different , 66 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming
1995).
18. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1225-31 (1977) (writing
before National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was overruled in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and identifying three bases for
national pollution control regulation: (1) the promotion of intrastate welfare; (2) the pre-
vention of interstate spillovers; and (3) the implementation of national moral ideals).
19. European Community (now European Union) law has evolved into a quasi-federal
regime, but the limited, original mandate of the Community to regulate trade and compe-
tition among sovereign nations has led to a greater focus on the respective competencies
of the Community and individual member states to regulate environmental matters. For
example, a recent European Commission decision allowing a German chemical ban, Com-
mission Decision 94/783 Concerning the Prohibition of PCP Notified by the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 1994 O.J. (L 316) 43, has been criticized both because it is inconsistent
with the nondiscriminatory trade policies of the European Union (EU) and because an
earlier EU directive on the use of the chemical adequately protected health concerns of
1995] 1319
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but the two ideas have been joined in our constitutional system.
Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence is an attempt to balance the
constitutional plan of competing centers of power within a single na-
tion, by developing principles to mediate conflicting assertions of reg-
ulatory authority.
The net result is that, whatever its general merits, the Supreme
Court's federalism jurisprudence is problematic from a biodiversity
perspective for three reasons. First, biodiversity protection is at best
an indirect goal of a federal system, and thus the Supreme Court's
decisions are often irrelevant. Second, Supreme Court federalism ju-
risprudence is an abstract and backward-looking doctrine that seeks
an ideal diffusion of power without a clear articulation of the values
sought to be advanced by this objective, which makes it difficult to
develop functional doctrines.2 ° Third, judicial federalism is problem-
atic for biodiversity protection, which seeks permanent, scientifically
driven solutions, because the balance of power between the national
and state governments can change in response to shifts in political
opinion.
Federalism jurisprudence continues to oscillate between radically
different views of the merits of a strong national government. Prior to
the New Deal, the constitutional assumption was that regulatory
power or competence must be exclusive either to the national govern-
ment or to the states in order to protect individual liberty through the
diffusion of regulatory power.2' However, this view subordinated the
Marshallian notion of a strong national government to deal with new
problems. During the New Deal, dual federalism was replaced with a
member nations. See generally Eckard Rehbinder & Richard Stewart, Environmental Protec-
tion Polity, in 2 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERI-
ENCE (Mario Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rehabilitating Federalism 92 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1994)
(reviewing SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERAL-
iSM (1993)). This incoherence is symptomatic of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's retreat
from constitutional adjudication which articulates the national experience to arid scholas-
ticism. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fun-
damentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 98 (1993) (observing that current Supreme Court
opinions reflect "hardly a trace of wisdom concerning the meaning of the American past
or the possibilities of its future ... no picture of American ideals or destiny ... no recogni-
tion that the world is rapidly changing and that the Court's understanding of the role of
law may be growing dangerously out of touch with American society").
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1561-62 (1988)
(locating the "checking" function of federalism in both classic republican and pluralist
political theory); see also Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425,
1492-1519 (1987) (arguing that the purpose of federalism is to create inter-governmental
competition to protect individual rights grounded in popular sovereignty).
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presumption of the need for national regulation 22 and the gradual
realization that politically rather than judicially enforced federalism
was the means to achieve the Constitution's objectives. The fruit of
this non-dual federalism was the theory of cooperative or "marble
cake" federalism,23 which underlies the law of pollution reduction. In
cooperative federalism, the states become the agents of the national
government. 24 The principal focus of constitutional law shifted from
concern about the infringement of reserved state authority to an in-
quiry into the congressional intent behind the preemption of state
regulatory authority. 25
The immediate consequence of the shifting nature of federalism
jurisprudence for biodiversity protection is that post-New Deal federal-
ism has in turn decayed into a fragile and often dysfunctional balance
between national and subordinate authority. Cooperative federalism
has proved better in theory than in practice,26 and the New Deal faith
in the need for national solutions has rapidly eroded in the past
twenty years.27 Instead of cooperative or "marble cake" federalism, we
22. Edwin Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1950) (argu-
ing that the New Deal Court dismantled the dual federalism system of constitutional inter-
pretation); see also BEER, supra note 20, at 379-92 (arguing that a strong national
government virtually unconstrained by reserved state sovereignty accurately reflects the
framers' intent).
23. The term was coined by Morton Grodzins. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYS-
TEM: A NEw VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (1966).
24. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423-25 (1992) (rejecting coopera-
tive federalism except in limited circumstances where the federal government preempts
state regulation).
25. The tradition of concern for state prerogatives, however, endures. See Deborah J.
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for the a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17-22 (1988) (expressing support for state rights and maintenance of the
federalist structure); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League
of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 107-09. See generally Symposium, Federalism's
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1994) (addressing the future roles of states and the federal
government).
26. The debate over the failure of New Deal federalism has centered on whether fed-
eral programs become captured by the regulated or benefited community, or whether the
efforts to isolate them from capture make them excessively cumbersome and costly to im-
plement. See PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERAuSM WoRIS 7-10 (1986).
27. This decay can be traced in the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence which
has evolved from a weak to a strong formal preference for concurrent regulatory authority.
Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (ruling that absent a
conflict with federal law, states may regulate matters not regulated by a federal act) with
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205 (1983) and R-J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986) (al-
lowing for concurrent regulation). The Court's application of the presumption remains
hopelessly incoherent. Compare Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616
(1991) (holding that federal pesticide law does not preempt local regulation of pesticide
application) with Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2388
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now have either prefectorial federalism or neo-dual federalism,2" re-
sulting in incomplete solutions to problems, especially resource man-
agement problems. Prefectorial federalism would require states to
comply with federal mandates but not fund the compliance costs or
provide other incentives to comply, while a neo-dual federalism re-
delegates power to the states with minimal federal controls.
This Article explores some familiar federalism problems through
the lens of biodiversity protection to illustrate the misfit between bi-
odiversity protection and federalism principles which arises from the
paradox of national objectives and sub-national implementation. Part
II of the Article examines the concept of biodiversity protection and
the science that supports it in order to illustrate the difficulties of im-
plementing biodiversity across jurisdictional boundaries. Part III de-
scribes five specific examples of the misfit between existing federalism
doctrines and biodiversity, and Part IV concludes with a brief exami-
nation of several new federal-state experiments that illustrate the de-
velopment of new federalism models that fit none of the existing
conventional or theoretical ones.
This Article argues that neither the New Deal presumption that
federal power should displace state power nor the neo-dualism pre-
sumption of non-preemption and return to exclusive competencies
promotes biodiversity protection. The risk of ineffective protection
arises from too much regulation with the New Deal model and too
little with neo-dualism.2 a As responsibility devolves, the historic resist-
ance of lower political jurisdictions to higher level mandates will in-
crease to the detriment of nature. If the idea of biodiversity
protection is to succeed, it must be articulated at the national level
and applied to all resource management activities by all levels of gov-
ernment. Biodiversity protection is, in fact, slowly evolving from a
central government mandate and responsibility to an obligation
shared at all levels of government, and, increasingly, by the private
sector as well. Federalism jurisprudence can make a modest contribu-
tion to this effort by replacing the current abstract doctrines with a
more focused inquiry. When a federal or state government has en-
(1992) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts state hazardous
waste licensing scheme).
28. SeeJOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE PoLTIcs OF MANAG-
ING THE MissouRI RIVER (1994) (providing an excellent study of the decay of federalism as
illustrated by the failure of federal agencies to manage the Missouri River effectively).
29. Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9J.
LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 203, 228-29 (1994) (arguing that the Clinton administration's plan
to increase state and local responsibility for wetlands management is not "likely to achieve
the plan's long-term goal of increasing the quantity and quality of the nation's wetlands").
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acted protection legislation, the presumption ought to be that this ob-
jective should be furthered at the jurisdictional level of the legislation
unless (1) Congress has clearly dictated a contrary result, or (2) core
federalism values, such as the protection of individual liberties or the
protection of the fundamental autonomy of the constituent units, re-
quire otherwise. This layered approach would not only retain the nec-
essary federal backstop, but also would take a more functional
approach to issues such as the concurrent exercise of regulatory au-
thority and the presumption against the exercise of federal power.
II. THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION
This section briefly describes the scientific basis of biodiversity
protection in order to illustrate the challenges that this concept poses
to the idea of political hierarchies and management units defined by
fixed physical boundaries. The argument advanced here is that the
basis of biodiversity protection is primarily scientific rather than ethi-
cal and that the emergence of a non-equilibrium paradigm in ecology
makes it more difficult to use science to protect biodiversity because
the idea of resource preservation to protect "nature" must be supple-
mented by the idea of adaptive management. In short, biodiversity
protection must inevitably be a shared, ongoing multi-jurisdictional
effort.
Biodiversity protection is based on a scientifically-influenced
ethic: "Let nature be." Philosophers have purported to raise a com-
plex and controversial scientific theory-that ecosystems tend toward
harmony or balance-to a Kantian and non-homocentric ethic."0 But
their effort to create an ethic divorced from the limits of the underly-
ing science has, at best, only reinforced science's claim that there are
important practical reasons for society to worry about the magnitude
of human-caused ecosystem disturbance and to develop protection
strategies that are scientifically-driven. 3' The philosopher's ethic can-
not be the basis for protection because it fails the test of providing
operative guidelines for resource management and because it cannot
adapt to changes in the underlying science.
30. E.g., J. BAIRD CALLcoTr, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC (1989).
31. This statement takes a clear position in the debate over whether environmentalism
is morally or spiritually based versus scientifically based. The scientific case is well articu-
lated in Holmes Roloston, III, Scien-Based Versus TradUional Ethics, in ETHICS OF ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT-: GLOBAL CHALLENGE, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 64 (J. Ronald
Engle & Joan G. Engel eds., 1993).
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A. Biodiversity Protection Defined
Biodiversity is defined as the "variety and variability within and
among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which they
occur."3 2 Diversity can be defined as the number of different items
and their relative frequency. For biological diversity, these items are
organized at many levels, ranging from complete ecosystems to the
chemical structures that are the molecular basis of heredity. Biodiver-
sity protection encompasses three levels of protection: (1) generic di-
versity, (2) species diversity, and (3) ecosystem or community
diversity.33 The last two measures have the largest impact on regula-
tion because the achievement of these objectives requires the delinea-
tion of new landscape boundaries. Thus, the term encompasses
different ecosystems, species, genes, and their relative abundance. Bi-
odiversity, however, is not simply a numbers game, but has a qualita-
tive component requiring native species in naturally occurring
patterns of abundance. Native species in naturally occurring patterns
are hallmarks of ecosystem health. For example, non-native species
may increase the quantity of species and genes but they destroy the
original patterns of interrelationships in the ecosystem.
Biodiversity is not easy to measure on the ground because the
core idea of species richness encompasses essentially normative rather
than scientific constructs. Biologists have developed measures of taxo-
nomic richness but these must be applied on differing geographic
scales. Biodiversity must be measured at the global, national and re-
gional level. Nonetheless, science is rapidly developing a set of meas-
ures for biodiversity on both small and large scales that can be used to
provide information about the status of current ecological trends and
to measure progress toward protection goals.3 4 The basic measures
are:
1. Percentage of Species Richness. This measure looks at factors such
as taxonomic richness, primarily plants and vertebrates.
2. Species at Risk. This measure examines the absolute number as
well as the percentage of species threatened with extinction or extir-
pation and the percentage of species at risk from habitat loss and
other stresses. It also can include indices of the range of risks that the
target species are facing. For example, "biodiversity hot spots" can be
32. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN
BIOLOGICAL DrvEEsrry 3 (1987).
33. JEFFREY A. MCNELLEY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BioDivmsRTy 17 (1990).
34. This analysis is adapted from WALTER RED ET AL., BIODVERsrrY INDICATORS FOR
POLICY MAKaRs (1993).
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identified based on the percentage of endemic species in relation to
the land area available to sustain them.
3. Protection Ratios. This measure seeks to inventory the effective-
ness of existing land dedications for habitat protection of threatened
and endemic species and other protection measures such as in situ
conservation. This index effectively highlights problem regions such
as Asia. For example, the percentage of land in protected areas is low
in the Pacific Rim, including Australia, compared to all other regions
of the world.3 5
4. Community Diversity Indicators. This index includes estimates of
the extent of area dominated by non-domesticated species and the
patch size of these areas. It also includes the amount of the area
within protected designations dominated by non-domestic vegetation,
agricultural crops, and livestock.
B. The Science of Biodiversity
Biodiversity protection can be seen as the logical outcome of the
ecological paradigm for resource management that emerged in the
1960s. To implement the politics of environmentalism, the perceived
teachings of ecology were quickly and uncritically incorporated into
environmental law and management.' Modem environmentalism
was a visceral reaction to visible and spectacular pollution insults or
public works projects that destroyed natural areas.3 7 National conser-
vation group opposition to multiple-purpose dams in the 1950s paved
the way for environmentalism, but the movement lacked a scientific
theory or, any theory for that matter."8 This movement had achieved
political and popular success sometime earlier on the neo-pagan the-
ory that nature-at least the landscape of the western part of the
United States-was divine. For example, in 1930, Robert Marshall,
one of the major proponents of wilderness preservation, contrasted
the "dynamic beauty" of primitive areas to the static beauty of a Gothic
cathedral and argued that "wilderness furnishes perhaps the best op-
portunity for pure aesthetic enjoyment. " "
35. Id. at 19.
36. See FRANK B. GoLLRY, A HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM IN ECOLOGY. MORE THAN THE
SUM OF ITS PARTS 3 (1993) (arguing that the environmental movement seized on the con-
cept of an ecosystem because it provided a rational explanation of nature).
37. See generally STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY 250-90 (1981) (discussing the
environmental movement from 1945-1965).
38. See id. at 285 (discussing opposition to Echo Park Dam in Colorado).
39. Robert Marshall, Wilderness Etheti, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSERVATION
IN AMERICA 78, 80 (Robert McHenry & Charles Van Doren eds., 1972).
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Aesthetic enjoyment continues to play a role in biodiversity pro-
tection, but the main thrust of current protection strategies focuses
upon rational resource management. There is a long and troubled
history of the application of science to natural resources management
in this country,40 but the search for scientific, comprehensive rational-
ity springs eternal, and in 1968 ecology offered the hope of coherent
and rational resources management which proved so elusive in the
past. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)41 is the
most enduring legal application of ecology. NEPA was the first piece
of federal legislation to raise ecology to primary status. NEPA's con-
cept of environmental assessment, along with risk assessment, remains
one of the few innovative operational ideas of environmental law. It
rested on the premise that ecology could provide the rationale to
guide administrative action. 42
Environmental law and policy is premised on the equilibrium
paradigm in ecology.43 This paradigm was based on Sir Alfred George
Tansley's ecosystem concept, which represented a break from earlier
theories.' The basic idea was that systems, not organisms, evolve;4 5
evolution was assumed to move toward homeostasis or balance. Tan-
sley's conceptual shift from an organism to a system carried with it the
longstanding scientific belief that all "systems" tended toward equilib-
rium.' The idea of a "holistic ecological concept which combined
living organisms and the physical environment into a system"'47 was a
theory in the grand scientific tradition: it was not based on field ob-
servations. Two American ecologists, Ralph Lindeman and Eugene
Odum, took the steps to make Tansley's theory operational in the
field.4" In so doing, they paved the way for the shift in environmental
policy discourse from the aesthetic and spiritual to the scientific. The
concept of "relatively stable dynamic equilibrium" crystallized for Tan-
40. See GRAF, supra note 15, at 244 (stating that scientists had limited involvement in
the wilderness debate).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988) [hereinafter NEPA].
42. See NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (outlining the purpose of NEPA).
43. I have traced this influence in A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibriumn Paradigm in Ecol-
ogy and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 Lay. L.A. L. REv. 1121 (1994), and in
Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An
Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 847 (1994).
44. Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 43, at 861.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 862.
47. GoLLY, supra note 36, at 8.
48. Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 43, at 862.
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sley in 1935,' 9 and has since been popularized by Aldo Leopold in his
A Sand County Almanac,"° published posthumously. In turn, these
ideas drew on the image of a nature in balance which was central to
both the Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment world view."1 For exam-
ple, the idea of the balance of nature radically disturbed by human
intervention was the signal message of Rachel Carson's indictment of
chemical pesticides, Silent Spring," perhaps the book most responsible
for the environmental movement.5"
Eugene Odum made an important extension of ecosystem theory
by providing a general hypothesis of ecosystem development and
function5 4 in a way that was understandable to an informed lay audi-
ence. He was the ecologist most read by the small group of social
scientists, lawyers, and others who developed the first generation of
environmental regulation in the unique political environment be-
tween the late 1960s and the OPEC oil embargo. 5 "Environmentalists
seized upon the ecosystem concept as a way to maintain their faith in
holism" 6 and to shore up their rapid political success with a universal
scientific justification.
For the non-scientist and the policy-maker seeking wisdom in the
late 1960s, Eugene Odum introduced the potential power of ecology
to rationalize natural resources management.57  Odum's brother,
Howard, took Lindeman's trophic level theories and reduced them to
mechanical theories of how ecosystems function, linked to the hard
49. A.G. Tansley, The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms, 16J. EcOLOGY 284
(1935).
50. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949).
51. See DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 32-35 (1990) (discussing the development of modem theories about the
balance of nature). The late CharlesJ. Meyers traced the influence of this idea on environ-
mental law in his 1975 Addison Harrison lectures at Indiana University, Bloomington.
CharlesJ. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms,
50 IND. LJ. 426, 439-45 (1975) (discussing four principles of ecology that promote the
balance of nature).
52. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 63-83 (1962).
53. Former Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall writes that Carson's book "was a mas-
terstroke .... It shifted the debate over pesticides into a context where ecological, not
economic, values would predominate." STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CIsIs AND THE
NEXT GENERATION 200 (1988). For a more detailed review of her contribution to the envi-
ronmental movement, which reaches the same conclusion, see Linda J. Lear, Rachel Car-
son's Silent Spring, 17 ENVTL. Hisr. REv. 23 (1993).
54. See DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE
ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 160 (1993) (discussing Eugene Odum's theory that ecosystems
evolve into a "symbiotic relationship" to control the surrounding environment).
55. See generally id. at 158-61 (discussing the impact and substance of Odum's theories).
56. GOLLEY, supra note 36, at 8.
57. See generally EUGENE ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY (1959).
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sciences.58 Eugene Odum used the pyramidal model of the food
chain in an ecosystem to develop a powerful theory that ecosystems
were greater than the sum of their parts and inevitably progressed to
steady states through the processes of climax and succession.5 9
Odum's text provided an elegant, scientific neo-Kantian principle
upon which environmental regulation and assessment could rest:
Homeostasis at the organism level is a well known concept in
physiology.... We find that equilibrium between organisms
and environment may also be maintained by factors which
resist change in the system as a whole. Much has been writ-
ten about this 'balance of nature' but only with the recent
development of good methods for measuring rates of func-
tion of whole system has a beginning been made in the un-
derstanding of the mechanisms involved.'
The ideal of scientific management burns bright,6' but there is a
problem: The science being developed to support biodiversity protec-
tion is more complicated than policy-makers originally assumed. A
paradigm shift in ecology is just beginning to penetrate the legal con-
sciousness. Since its incorporation into environmental law and policy,
the equilibrium paradigm has undergone a Kuhnian revolution.6"
The equilibrium concept was flawed from the start, but until recently
many scientists and policy-makers thought that the problem was the
lack of necessary data rather than in the paradigm itself.6 By the
1980s, the equilibrium paradigm had been replaced with more hard-
edged probabilistic theories of non-equilibrium ecosystem behavior.'
58. "In the ecosystem model, species acted abstractly, like robots." GoLEY, supra note
36, at 106.
59. See ODUM, supra note 57, at 13-16 (using a pond as an example of an ecosystem at
work).
60. Id. at 25.
61. One of the most persistent criticisms of environmental law is that it is based on
"bad" rather than "good" science, consequently reforms seek to move toward more scientif-
ically based solutions. In the current political debate over the future of environmentalism,
both the Republican Congress and the Clinton administration place great faith in the ap-
plication of good science. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Interior, Protecting America's Living Heri-
tage: A Fair, Cooperative and Scientifically Sound Approach to Improving the
Endangered Species Act, Mar. 6, 1995 (memorandum).
62. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRucruii OF ScmiNFc REVOLUtIONS x-xii (1962).
63. Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 43, at 869.
64. Id. We can now more clearly understand that Odum's theory of ecosystem equilib-
rium is one of the last gasps of 19th century deterministic science and was more descriptive
than integrative. It was a sophisticated and nuanced extension of Clements's theory of
plant communities as stable superorganisms as the consequence of a series of successional
stages leading to a superorganistic permanent climax. Frederick E. Clements, The Nature
and Structure of the Climax, 24J. ECOLOGY 252, 255-56 (1936). In elite science, deterministic
theories had already been replaced by probabilistic ones, but the shift came late to biology
1328 [VOL. 54:1315
1995] BIODIVERSITY FEDERALISM 1329
Non-equilibrium ecology rejects the vision of a balance of nature65
with its deep roots in both religious and Enlightenment mechanistic
thinking.66 As one ecologist recently commented, "The idea [of bal-
ance of nature] makes good poetry but bad science."67 In a path-
breaking book, Daniel Botkin has "deconstructed" the equilibrium
paradigm as a misguided effort to match science to theological and
scientific visions of a perfect universe.68 His basic argument is that the
images of nature which had influenced ecology were static when, in
practice, the problems faced required a dynamic view of nature-one
which starts from the premises that human action is one of the princi-
pal forces operating on ecosystems and that system disturbances are
both predictable and random.69
Ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that exist for
finite periods of time. 70  The accelerating interaction between
humans and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to
the concept of an ideal state of nature. 71 The best evidence of this
paradigm shift is a short but extremely influential Great Ideas for Ecology
for the 1990s published in 1992 by Eugene P. Odum himself.72 His first
and over-arching great idea states that "an ecosystem is a thermody-
namically open, far from equilibrium system. " 7.
and even later to ecology. See Daniel Simberloff, A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essen-
tialism to Materialism and Probabalism, in CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN ECOLOGY 63 (Esa Saarinen
ed., 1982). Ecologists reported varying levels of indeterminate results testing the para-
digm, but many scientists glossed over them because of an extreme case of "physics-envy."
J.E. Cohen, Mathematics and Metaphor, 172 SCIENCE 674 (1971). The point for lawyers is
that this internal debate was missed in the rush to implement Leopold's dictum to "think
like a mountain" in the heady days of the rise of environmentalism. The dictum continues
to dominate environmental thinking. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land and Pigrim Leopold, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 217 (1990) (championing Leopold's philosophy).
65. Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1129.
66. Id.; Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 43, at 869.
67. Wallace Kaufman, How Nature Really Works, AMERiCAN FoaR.rs, Mar./Apr. 1993, at
17, 18.
68. BOTKN, supra note 51, at 188-92. The relationship between biodiversity and the
idea that nature expresses God's perfection is traced in Mark Sagoff, Biodiversity and the
Culture of Ecology, 74 BuLL. ECOLOGICAL Soc'Y AM. 374 (1993).
69. Id.
70. D.L. Urban et al., Landscape Ecology, 37 BIOSCIENCE 119 (1987).
71. The philosophical basis for the new ecology can be found in Bill McKibben's widely
read, The End of Nature, which argues the modem mind separates humanity from nature
and thus the romantic visions of harmony between humanity and nature are impossible.
WiLI m T. MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989).
72. Eugene P. Odum, Great Ideas for Ecology for the 1990s, 42 BIOSCIENcE 542 (July/Aug.
1992).
73. Id. Ironically, Odum cites the third edition of his classic text, EUGENE P. ODUM,
BASIC ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1983).
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The new paradigm challenges the biodiversity preservation strate-
gies adopted in the first generation of environmental laws. The legal
implications of the non-equilibrium paradigm are substantial over
space and time.7 4 Adherents to the non-equilibrium paradigm have
pioneered a sophisticated new regulatory, scientific, conservation biol-
ogy to protect ecosystems from human insults.75 Conservation biology
seeks to understand relationships between species extinction and
habitat fragmentation7 6 and to develop models that adaptively man-
age minimum habitat reserves for endangered species. As a conse-
quence, resource management generally is shifting from preservation
as the dominant biodiversity strategy to preservation as an integral
component of ecosystem restoration and adaptive management. 77 At
best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or preserved,
and management will become a series of calculated, risky experi-
ments. 78 "[N]ature moves and changes and involves risks and uncer-
tainties and ... our judgments of our actions must be made against
this moving target."79 The basic management objective is, through
adaptive management,8 ° to manage nature to mimic natural systems
based on evolving scientific information.8'
III. THE MISFIT BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION
Biodiversity protection, which must cope with the implications of
the non-equilibrium paradigm, does not mesh well with federalism for
a number of reasons. The most important are: (1) federalism often
impedes the protection of biodiversity because the political bounda-
ries of the federal system do not match ecosystem boundaries; (2)
many of the implementation problems involve conflicts among differ-
ent federal agency mandates, a subject outside the scope of traditional
federalism jurisprudence; (3) many of the constitutional values sought
74. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR FEDERAL ACQuISITION OF
LANDS FOR CONSERVATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SETTING PRIoRmTIES FOR LAND
CONSERVATION 113-38 (1993) [hereinafter COMMrrrEE FOR FEDERAL ACQUISITION OF LANDS]
(discussing why national resources management is now an ongoing experiment instead of
a series of discrete, final decisions).
75. See generally CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
(M.E. Soule & B. Wilcox eds., 1980) (series of articles discussing the preservation of
biological diversity and its evolutionary potential).
76. See Bruce A. Wilcox & Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Frag-
mentation on Extinction, 125 Am. NATURALIST 879 (1985).
77. COMMITTEE FOR FEDERAL AcQUISITION OF LANDS, supra note 74, at 113-38.
78. Id.
79. BOTKIN, supra note 51, at 190.
80. See supra note 74.
81. BOTMN, supra note 51, at 190.
1330 (VOL. 54:1315
BIODVERSiTY FEDERALISM
to be protected by federalism, specifically those protecting private
property and individual liberty interests, are difficult to adapt to bi-
odiversity protection; (4) federalism jurisprudence is neutral with re-
spect to biodiversity maintenance and thus Supreme Court decisions
and doctrines are as likely to hinder as promote it; and (5) the de-
mands of biodiversity protection exceed the effective ability, as op-
posed to the constitutional authority, of the national government to
achieve effective protection without state and local cooperation in the
experiment.
A. The Boundary Mismatch
Biodiversity protection necessarily collapses jurisdictional bound-
aries while management strategies can be frustrated by federalism's
instinctive search for an exclusive management authority over a partic-
ular resource. One of the central problems of scientific natural re-
sources management from the post-Civil War era to the present has
been the mismatch between natural systems and political boundaries.
The Constitution provides only two mechanisms for interstate cooper-
ation to overcome these legal barriers to better resource manage-
ment: the Supremacy Clause82 and the Compact Clause.8" Neither is
entirely satisfactory. In the twentieth century, the interstate compact
emerged as a potential vehicle to overcome the rigidity of political
boundaries, but, aside from the allocation of some major river sys-
tems, the hope of then-Professor Felix Frankfurter85 and others for
the use of compacts to address urgent cross-jurisdictional problems
has atrophied. The extreme difficulty of moving from narrow to
ecosystem-wide approaches to resource management is illustrated by
the fate of efforts to manage resources through river basin rather than
jurisdiction models.
Starting with John Wesley Powell's efforts to realign the Home-
stead laws with watershed boundaries to promote efficient water use86
through the 1960s, there have been many efforts to overcome the mis-
match of federalism and biodiversity through the creation of new
82. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
83. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
84. The most comprehensive study remains JEROME C. MUS, INTERSTATE WATER COM-
PACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1971).
85. Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685, 701-03 (1925) (discussing the benefit of and ne-
cessity for interstate compacts).
86. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED
STATES WITH A MORE DETAILED AccouNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH (Wallace Stegner ed.,
1962).
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overlay institutions or intergovernmental cooperation institutions.
The effort most relevant to biodiversity protection has been the river
basin model. River basin models attempt to integrate land and water
(as well as air quality) regulation around river development and use.
From the 1930s through the 1950s, planners and resource managers
urged the creation of authorities modeled after the Tennessee Valley
Authority to manage all major rivers. The idea lives on in the current
efforts to organize water quality and quantity management around a
watershed approach 7 and in the Clinton administration's attempts to
develop a flood control policy that relies less on expensive and inef-
fective dams and levees and more on less costly flood damage avoid-
ance strategies.8 8 However, the river basin or watershed model has
not succeeded. Fragmentation rather than integration is the real rule
of resource management. Federalism helps to maintain this condi-
tion because it can only reinforce the constitutionally mandated frag-
mentation of authority.
Resource management problems are still managed within ex-
isting political boundaries and remain focused on specific media.
Moreover, regulatory approaches, such as our wetlands programs, are
reactive; the project initiator, rather than the regulator, defines the
geographical scope of the regulatory response. In one of the fore-
most studies of biodiversity protection, ecologist John Cairns, Jr. put
the point succinctly:
Ecologists perpetually talk about the interdependence of na-
ture and lip service is given to this notion on Earth Day, but,
in practice, environmental problems are approached one
fragment at a time, not as a complex, multivariate, interde-
pendent landscape. The coexistence of technology[ ] and
biodiversity depends on switching from a fragmented to a
landscape view. 9
The adoption of the goal of biodiversity protection has profound
implications for all existing land-use categories because it calls for new
allocations of management responsibility among different levels of
government in both federal and unitary systems of government. Bi-
odiversity protection requires either the dedication of significant
87. See Long's Peak Report, Reforming National Water Polity: America's Waters: A New Era
of Sustainability, Report of the Long's Peak Working Group on National Water Policy, 24 ENVrL. L.
157 (1994).
88. INTERAGENCY FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE:
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21sr CENTURY (1994).
89. Pete Lavigne, Challenges in Watershed Activism, RIVER VOICES, Summer 1994, at 1, 1
(quoting John Cairns, Jr.).
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amounts of land to habitat reserves or the intensive management of
public lands dedicated to commodity protection such as timber har-
vesting and livestock grazing. It requires equally new controls on land
dedicated to new urban, industrial development as well as on existing
agricultural lands. Land-use regulation is divided (either by "tide" or
the right to use or control) among different levels of governments,
public and semi-public entities, and private individuals. A biodiversity
perspective collapses these boundaries and ownership classifications
as species and ecosystems do not respect these artificial boundaries.
But the history of reliance on politically bound entities to manage
physical problems continues to frustrate biodiversity protection. 90
B. The Problem is Inter-Federal Agency Conflict
A major barrier to the achievement of biodiversity protection is
the persistence of outmoded federal resource exploration and man-
agement mandates at the end of the twentieth century. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, public lands and related re-
sources were withdrawn from entry so that they could be more effi-
ciently managed for commodity protection. These mandates have
been supplemented (but not supplanted) by preservation and bi-
odiversity maintenance mandates. However, agencies often resist
adapting their missions to these new mandates, in large part because
states and state-based interest groups constitute the agency's constitu-
ency, and biodiversity protection suffers as a result of inter-agency
conflicts. For example, in reviewing the Clinton administration's for-
est recovery plan to protect old growth forests in the Pacific North-
west, a district judge noted that for years federal land management
agencies "had operated independently and sometimes in conflict."9
Inter-agency conflicts generally come to the courts over questions of
statutory interpretation rather than preemption, but federalism con-
cerns may in fact explain many cases in which a court has construed a
statute to favor the agency with the least incentive to protect biodivers-
ity, or where a court has refused to resolve an inter-agency conflict.
The South Dakota water marketing litigation controversy is an ex-
ample of inter-agency conflicts resolved in a way that frustrates bi-
90. The legacy of the past can be seen in the proposed rule for the most ambitious
experiment in ecosystem management to date, the protection of the spotted owl in the old
growth forests of California, Oregon and Washington. The proposed Special Rule for the
Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl on Non-Federal Lands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9494, 9495
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (proposed Feb. 17, 1995), excludes the State of Oregon
because an effort is underway to develop a state-private landowner stakeholder manage-
ment strategy.
91. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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odiversity protection. In the 1980s, South Dakota wanted to market
water to a coal slurry pipeline from what it considered its equitable
share of the Missouri River impounded in a federal reservoir." The
Oahe reservoir was built by the Army Corps of Engineers, but jointly
managed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps as part of a
complex 1944 legislative compromise over how the River should be
developed. 3 South Dakota signed a contract with the Department of
Interior rather than the Corps because the Corps indicated that it
would take two or three years to conduct the studies necessary to issue
a permit.94 Downstream states, which benefit from the Corps's man-
agement of the river for navigation enhancement, challenged the con-
tract, and the Supreme Court held that the Department of Interior
had no authority to execute it because the Corps, not the Department
of Interior, built the dam.95 The decision effectively put the manage-
ment of the Missouri River in the hands of the agency that has done
the most to degrade the biodiversity of the river by destroying riparian
habitat.96
In the late 1980s, upstream states unsuccessfully attempted to
modify the operation of the reservoirs to benefit sport fishing.97 As is
often the case, the application of the Endangered Species Act
changed the political dynamic. The Corps began to respond to these
concerns in January 1995, when the Fish and Wildlife Service an-
nounced that it was considering listing two fish as endangered." The
Corps has proposed a shortened navigation season in order to keep
more water upstream during the spring spawning season. 99
As Congress responds to biodiversity concerns, courts have more
opportunities to strike a new balance. Judicial intervention in the
management of the Columbia River illustrates the power of a court to
subordinate traditional federalism concerns to a national mandate
when the issue is clearly presented to it. In brief, the damming of the
92. ETST Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 497-98 (1988); see THORSON, supra
note 28, at 86-90 (detailing the history of this episode during our short-lived quest for
energy independence).
93. ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 498, 500.
94. Id. at 497-501.
95. Id. at 497-99; see John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REv. 347, 437
(1985) (discussing the history of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-709, and
the subsequent development of the Missouri River).
96. THORSON, supra note 28, at 83-85 (discussing the effect of the Corps of Engineers'
management of the Missouri River).
97. South Dakota v. Hazen, 914 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1990); see THORSON, supra note 28, at
176-81.
98. 60 Fed. Reg. 3614 (1995).
99. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WESTERN STATES WATER, No. 1083 (1995).
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Columbia River for power and irrigation has pushed many species of
salmon to the brink of extinction. In 1980, Congress created a fed-
eral-state planning council and mandated that power and fish be
given equal weight in the management of the river.'0 0 The Northwest
Power Planning Council eventually adopted a water budget to pro-
duce adequate flows for salmon, while also meeting power demands.
The water budget approach did not, however, appear to reverse the
decline of salmon runs. 10 In 1992, the Council adopted a new Strat-
egy for Salmon, rejecting the fishery managers' call for substantially in-
creased spring and summer flows, which would decrease water
available for power generation. Instead, the Council adopted an in-
cremental approach thereby postponing confrontation of the conflict
between declining runs and power generation.10 2 Environmental
groups along with Indian tribes successfully challenged the incremen-
tal policy on procedural grounds derived from the purpose of the
NWPPCA.
In a forceful and historically engaged opinion, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside the Council's Strategy because it conflicted
with the Act for two reasons. 10 3 First, the Council failed to provide an
adequate written justification, as required by the Act, when it rejected
the recommendations of the fishery agencies and tribes.'0 4 The fail-
ure to give substantial weight to the opinions of those with fisheries
expertise undermined the legislative mandate that hydropower and
fish and wildlife interests be given parity.'0 5 Second, the court found
that the Council failed to adopt "sound biological objectives," such as
particle travel time, because "the record evidences the Council's in-
tent ultimately to refrain from adopting biological objectives," which
also conflicted with the parity mandate of the Act.10 6 The NWPPC
responded with a new salmon strategy in December 1994 which pro-
100. Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPPCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-
839h (1988); see Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the
Pacific Northwest Electr Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1983).
101. SeeJohn M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly: Columbia River
Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Managemen 23 ENVrL. L. 1249, 1252-63
(1993) (discussing the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Coun-
cil's attempt to link energy conservation with fish and wildlife recovery). For a balanced
history of the development of the Columbia River for power at the expense of salmon, see
WiujAM DIETRICH, THE GRrAT COLUMBIA RVER (1995).
102. Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. Id. at 1383-95.
104. Id. at 1386-89.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1392. The court was influenced by Idaho Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v. NMPS,
850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Ore. 1994), which found that the National Marine Fisheries Service's
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vides more water for the fish and less for power generation. 10 7 Dam
operations through the system will be modified, but most of the new
flows will come from releases from the four federal dams on the lower
Snake River. 108
C. The Conflict Between Biodiversity Protection and the Constitutional
Values of Localism
Federalism doctrines may undermine biodiversity for both ethical
and practical reasons because they unduly check national authority.
Biodiversity protection is more the province of national elites than
local citizens and runs counter to the often expressed preferences for
lower-level rather than higher-level political control for the use of pri-
vate property claims to block environmental regulation. The fact that
biodiversity is frustrated by lower-level resistance is, of course, not in
and of itself a basis for criticizing a constitutionally derived doctrine.
However, biodiversity protection may provide a new interest for courts
to consider in federalism and constitutional adjudication when no
other compelling constitutional values are at stake.
The root of the problem is the preference for local decision-mak-
ing that runs through much federalism jurisprudence. This prefer-
ence can frustrate biodiversity because it concentrates power at the
level where opposition to biodiversity protection may be the strongest.
The preference for local decision-making rests on an alternative vision
of the virtues of America as a confederation of city-states, coexisting
with the Marshallian vision of a strong central government curbing
parochial tendencies. Professor Carol Rose finds the persistence "of
stubborn local particularism" a logical "evolution of a kind of Anti-
Federalist praxis, almost invisible in an intellectual environment of
overwhelming Federalist theory. '19 Biodiversity protection is espe-
cially vulnerable to this form of localism because it is both a novel and
thus difficult theoretical, legal, and political problem.
biological opinion was arbitrary and capricious. Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., 35 F.3d at
1390-91.
107. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WESTERN STATES WATER, No. 1075 (1994).
108. Id.
109. Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from
the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 99 (1989). Some times
the vision is not so faint. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit community from dumping
adult movie theatres next to the tracks); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34
(1985) (finding that state authorization immunizes municipal land use and utility policies
from antitrust liability); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding that a
restrictive definition of family promotes "the blessings of quiet seclusion" which outweighs
any rights of association and travel).
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Biodiversity protection excites intense opposition because it
counsels the partial subordination of immediate human demands to
longer term human and non-human concerns.110 Biodiversity protec-
tion is the more difficult concept to understand because it is at an
extreme edge of the anthropocentric paradigm of law as a set of
human relationships. Protection objectives are often phrased as utili-
tarian objectives. However, the thrust of many efforts to maintain or
restore the integrity of ecosystems as a hedge against future and
largely unknown risks111 comes close to an intrinsic justification,112
and the legitimacy of this value is the subject of intense debate. The
great issue is whether the scientific rather than the aesthetic case for
of biodiversity protection can overcome the natural human resistance
to the subordination of immediate human demands. The likelihood
is that the level of state and local resistance to biodiversity protection
will be more intense compared to pollution and hazardous waste pro-
tection. At the practical level, biodiversity protection is difficult to im-
plement because land-use regulations infringe on both public
prerogatives and private choices about the exploitation and use of
land and related water resources and because such regulations run
counter to development expectations long explicit in the administra-
tion of land-use and water laws.
Federal public land and water law, and the "takings" jurispru-
dence113 of the Supreme Court are the two prime areas of the law
where localism frustrates biodiversity protection. In federal public
land and water resources law, the Supreme Court has frequently used
the history of western settlement to conclude that Congress did not
intend to exercise its full constitutional power to protect public
lands. 4 This has led to extreme but unsuccessful constitutional
110. See CAmUCo-r, supra note 30.
111. See WILSON, supra note 10, at 271-72.
112. See BIODIVERSriY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Simon Bilderbeck ed., 1992) (collection
of speeches discussing the importance of biodiversity protection); Doremus, supra note 6
(discussing four rationales for biodiversity protection). See generally Susan Emmenegger &
Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature's Rights: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law,
6 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 545 (1994) (discussing range of theories justifying biodiversity
protection).
113. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part, "No person shall be... deprived of
... property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
114. The Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2, 3, gives Congress the powers of
both a sovereign and a proprietor, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), as well as
the power to regulate the use of adjacent non-federal land to protect a federal land man-
agement unit. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C.
L. REv. 617 (1985) (tracing the history of resistance to the theory that the Property Clause
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claims that the federal government lacks the power to manage or even
to retain federal lands and has unnecessarily weakened the power of
the federal government to protect biodiversity. 11 5  The Supreme
Court's reluctance to conclude that Congress has exercised the full
extent of its power manifests itself in continuing local resistance to
non-commodity uses of public land and in the continued willingness
of federal officials to subordinate federal power to state and local
interests.
The presumption of non-exercise can be seen in federal non-In-
dian reserved water rights law. As proprietor of the public lands, Con-
gress has the power to reserve water rights to fulfill the purposes of a
federal reservation such as a national monument or park. 116 This
power allows the land management agencies to reserve instream flows
to protect ecosystem integrity on public lands. This authority could
be a major component of a national biodiversity protection strategy as
the doctrine applies to public lands in all parts of the country. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has used the presumption of non-exercise
virtually to eviscerate the doctrine. In 1978, the Court held that there
is no implied intent to reserve water when federal lands are set aside
for a water-related purpose, unless a reserved right is (1) necessary to
prevent the frustration of the purpose of the withdrawal, and (2) is for
a primary rather than secondary management purpose.1 1 7 This nar-
row standard effectively destroys the federal government's reserved
water rights in national parks and monuments, and leaves national
forests and Bureau of Land Management lands unprotected.
1 8
is a full grant of congressional power to manage public lands). Public land users, however,
resist Kieppe. See United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1006 (1989) (rejecting the argument that Congress lacks power over public lands because
it is not an enumerated Article I grant).
115. Western states and local communities continually deny federal power to retain pub-
lic lands. For a history of the most recent "Sage Brush Rebellion," see GEORGE C. COGGINS
ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 194-96 (3d ed. 1993).
116. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (holding that the federal
government reserves the right to maintain sufficient water levels when it reserves a national
park); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (finding that Congress has power to ap-
portion Colorado River among states).
117. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978). At the time of the litiga-
tion, the New Mexico State Supreme Court did not recognize instrearn appropriations be-
cause a physical diversion was required to perfect a water right and the state had enacted
no legislation to authorize instream flow appropriations. Id. at 704, 713. Ironically, the
case arose out of the Gila National Forest where Aldo Leopold first articulated the need for
wilderness areas. See LEOPOLD, supra note 50, at 122-54.
118. The Department of Justice made a substantial effort to use fluvial geomorphology
to establish the need for stream flows in national forests to further the two primary pur-
poses of national forests-timber production and downstream watershed protection. How-
ever, a Colorado Water Judge rejected that theory of federal reserved rights. In re
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Takings law is an example of the opposite problem: federal law
that is insufficiently deferential to local situations in a way that im-
pedes the protection of biodiversity. Private property is a protected
constitutional right, but it is different from other civil rights. The rea-
son for the difference is not, as the Supreme Court suggested in the
famous Carolene Products footnote,1 9 because economic rights are less
important than human rights, but because property rights are subject
to limitations that are more geographically based than human
rights. 120 The right to free exercise of property rights should be the
same in Florida as it is in Utah, but a property owner's expectation
that she has the right to drain a wetland or build in a sensitive area
may not be the same. This idea, however, has been submerged in the
Court's taking cases.
There are two major issues in takings law: (1) What percentage
of the value of the property can a regulation diminish, and (2) even if
this threshold is exceeded, can the diminution in value be excused? 121
The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil'22 recognized that a government regulation does not constitute a
taking if the regulation simply codifies "background principles of nui-
sance and property law," although it is clear thatJustice Scalia did not
intend the Lucas rationale as a widely available justification for severe
regulation.22' Background limitations based in the common law re-
flect the idea that property is a legal construct and that the Constitu-
Amended Application of the United States of America for Reserved Rights in the Platte
River, District Court, Water Division No. 1, No. W-8439-79. Another WaterJudge used the
same evidence to recognize federal reserved rights in flows for the Rocky Mountain Na-
tional Park because they were consistent with Congress's concern for the preservation of
natural conditions and scenic beauty. Memorandum of Decision and Order Concerning
the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America for Reserved Rights in
Rocky Mountain National Park, District Court, Water Division No. 1, No. W-8439-76, Dec.
29, 1993; seeJohn R. Hill, Colorado Court Recognizes Reserved Rights to Instream Flows in Rocky
Mountain National Park, 5 RIvERs 243 (1995) (agreeing with the decision finding federal
reserved rights in flows for Rocky Mountain National Park); Terresa A. Rice, Colorado Water
Court Denied Reserved Rights Claims for Channel Maintenance Flows, 4 RvERs 146 (1993) (criti-
cizing the decision to reject the Department of Justice's attempt to find federal reserved
rights in instream flows in national forests).
119. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
120. See TIMOTHY BEATLY, ETHICAL LAND USE: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND PLANNING 130
(1994).
121. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2892-2902 (1992).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2900. The broader issue is whether the Lucas majority was correct in limiting
restrictions on the use of property solely to common law nuisance. For an argument that
the majority's approach is inconsistent with the history of judicial identification of the
sources of land use regulation, see Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the
Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329 (1995).
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tion permits the state to define the scope of its use by providing
property owners with adequate notice of the non-recognition of a
claim. A federalism reading of the Lucas qualification would afford
substantial deference to state law in defining the background condi-
tions"' and would support a less unidimensional concept of property
than currently exists in Supreme Court jurisprudence."2 5 A federal-
ism approach to the definition of property rights would not compel
the adoption of an ecological concept of property, but would incorpo-
rate an ecosystem support limitation into the right,"2 6 and would per-
mit states to integrate this approach into takings law. 1
2 7
This is not an abstract concern given that post-Lucas state takings
cases have, in fact, promoted biodiversity, contrary to Justice Scalia's
hostility to the idea. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the
enforcement of state radiation control regulations against a mill that
produced uranium tailings was not a taking because no investment-
backed expectations were frustrated. 128 "The Mill was 'on notice' that
the radioactive materials present on the property were dangerous and
highly regulated at both the state and federal level as was the use of
the property itself."2 9
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has remanded a tak-
ings claim to determine if a city can prevent the development of litto-
ral land flooded by a public waterbody under the Lucas title limitation
doctrine.'3 0 The Nevada Supreme Court has held that regulatory de-
lays in development approvals in the Lake Tahoe Basin do not consti-
124. See Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, The Individual, and Society: Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REv. 162, 201-02 (1993) (arguing that after
Lucas, the common law of nuisance will govern the determination of whether a taking has
occurred). But see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on
Lucas andJudicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1993) (pointing out the ten-
sion in Lucas between the desire to expand the scope of regulatory takings and the Court's
respect for "our federalism").
125. See Fred P. Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24
ENvrL. L. 1139 (1994) (arguing that no single "land ethic" is adequate to define property
for Fifth Amendment purposes).
126. See LEoPoLD, supra note 50, at 201-26 (providing the foundation of the ecological
definition); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. Rxv. 1433, 1438 (1993) (sketching a concept
of property as a usufruct rather than an exclusive right to maximization exploitation);
Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About Whether
Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA L. REv. 297, 308-
21 (1995).
127. See Michelman, supra note 124, at 318-28 (discussing a potential combined state-
federal federalism approach post-Lucas).
128. Colorado Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994).
129. Id. at 1000.
130. Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994).
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tute a taking because the developer had notice of a complex
regulatory process, and the protection of the Tahoe Basin would ben-
efit the developer when his property was granted development ap-
proval.1 3 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa used a similar analysis to hold
that state legislation protecting Indian burial mounds on private prop-
erty precluded a takings claim.1 3 ' A recent survey of federal and Flor-
ida law concludes that if the state restores riverine and wetland
ecosystems by flooding land reclaimed from the beds of navigable wa-
ters "[t] he property owner may not be entitled to compensation to the
extent that value has been created by government public works specif-
ically enhancing their property."1 33
D. Federalism Jurisprudence Provides Inconsistent Protection of Biodiversity
Biodiversity protection has suffered both from the Supreme
Court's application of preemption and related doctrines to federal
natural resources law for the reasons discussed in the last section, and
for opposite reasons discussed in the previous sections. Local checks
on national insensitivity have often been ignored. Since the progres-
sive era, the national government has asserted an increasingly strong
interest in the management and use of natural resources both on and
off federal public lands. This gradual assertion challenged strong
state and private expectations that the national role would be limited
to facilitating the disposal of public lands or setting the ground rules
for the acquisition of the privilege to exploit." The result is a natural
resources federal jurisprudence with a strong presumption that state
law controls federal law with the exception of the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission and federal regulation of water rights. In this
context, biodiversity preservation suffers as much as it gains.
The basis of the presumption of state control is the recent asser-
tion of a national interest in natural resources management. During
the nineteenth century, complementary federal and state interests re-
sulted in few jurisdictional or legal conflicts, but federal power was
considerably limited in purpose and geographic scope. Water alloca-
tion and management is not an enumerated constitutional power,
although the Commerce Clause has been accepted as a source of fed-
131. Kelly v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 684 (1994).
132. Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1313 (1995).
133. Sharon S. Tisher, Everglades Restoration: A Constitutional Takings Analysis, 10J. LAND
USE & ENvrL. L. 1, 44 (1994).
134. See George C. Coggins, Trends in Public Land Law, in NATURAL RESOURCES POLiCY
AND LAw, TRENDS AND DIRECrIONS (Lauren J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 1993)
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eral power to control navigation. Until the twentieth century, the as-
sumption was that federal power was limited to commercially
navigable rivers. Accordingly, the federal government confined itself
to the promotion of inland navigation" 5 and to the disposition of the
public domain to the states and private individuals. This minimal fed-
eral role changed at the end of the nineteenth century with the emer-
gence of reliable scientific information about the consequences of
rapid resource exploitation. Science provided the foundation for the
progressive conservation movement which was premised on the need
for a strong federal role in natural resources policy. 136 To conserve
resources, the progressive conservation agenda included federal re-
tention of public lands, the construction of multiple purpose water
resources projects and federal financial support for irrigation
projects. With the exception of flood control projects, most federal
efforts were concentrated in the western United States because federal
public land disposition policy was inadequate for arid lands.'1 7
The major legal consequences of the progressive conservation
movement were delayed until the New Deal when the modem era of
large multi-purpose water projects began. Federal-state conflicts were
initially minimal because the federal government did not seek to dis-
place state allocation institutions and law. On the contrary, Congress
mandated that the two major federal construction water agencies, the
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, must acquire the necessary water rights under state law and oper-
ate the federal projects in a manner consistent with state law.138
Congress had imposed a similar mandate on the Federal Power Com-
mission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), which was
created in 1920 to license private hydroelectric projects on navigable
waters.139
Power follows the purse, however, and federal policies began to
conflict with state policies. To resolve these conflicts, the Supreme
Court eventually rendered a series of decisions that validated the ex-
panding federal water resources allocation and preempted inconsis-
tent state water laws."4 Recently, the Court has begun to return to
135. BEATRICE H. HOLMES, A HISTORY OF FFDERL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS, 1800-
1960 (1972).
136. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 1-4 (1959).
137. See DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH OF AN ENVIRON-
MENTAL ETHIC (1991).
138. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1988).
139. Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1988).
140. See cases cited infra notes 155-168.
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the original vision of the federal-state balance. 141 The earlier preemp-
tion decisions, moreover, were tied to the construction of multiple
purpose flood control and reclamation projects. Their immediate rel-
evance has diminished as the era of the construction of federal water
projects to promote regional growth has ended.1 42 However, the
growing importance of federal environmental regulatory programs
which impact the use of water, such as the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act, continues to produce federal-state
conflicts. 143
1. Water Management: Reserved Rights and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion-From a strictly legal point of view, there are no federal-state con-
flicts over water management. The federal government either has the
constitutional power to control the use of water or it does not. If the
federal government has the power, the Supremacy Clause displaces
conflicting state law. 44 If the federal government lacks the constitu-
tional power to regulate, state law is the exclusive source of authority.
The history of federal deference to state law complicates this anal-
ysis. Federal-state disputes have classically revolved around three stat-
utory construction problems: (1) Congress's intent to exercise federal
power; (2) Congress's intent to preempt the field and exclude state
regulation; and (3) the existence of provisions allowing continuing,
coordinate or subordinate state power. The last inquiry is particularly
important because Congress has generally deferred to state water law
in the operation of federal programs. Section 8 of the Reclamation
Act is the model for shared federal-state responsibility in the use of
water. It provides "[t] hat nothing in this Act shall be constructed as
affecting or intended to affect in any way [or] interfere with the laws
of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water used in irrigation." 45
Federal reclamation law illustrates the use of state law as a bi-
odiversity protection check on federal authority. The basic idea be-
hind the Reclamation Act of 1902 was that the federal government
would provide the financing for the construction of small reclamation
141. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
142. FELDMAN, supra note 137.
143. See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation DiSt. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
144. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. For an insightful analysis of the difference between the
Supremacy Clause and preemption, and an argument that modem doctrines such as field
preemption cannot be derived from the Supremacy Clause, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The
Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. Rav. 767 (1994).
145. Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (Supp. V 1993).
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projects serving family farmers. Water rights would be acquired and
distributed in accordance with state law. To limit the distribution of
water to bona fide yeomen, as opposed to speculators, the delivery of
waters was limited to 160 acres for single ownership or 320 acres for
land owned by a husband and wife." 4 The history of federal reclama-
tion law is one of constant adjustment to the reality of irrigation. In
most areas, the cost of reclaiming arid land was too costly to realize
enough return to repay the projects.147 Accordingly, reclamation
gradually evolved from a self-financing to a federal subsidy program,
financed by the generation of hydroelectric power, and thus the fed-
eral government's management authority grew. 148 Reclamation pro-
gram subsidies are now either interest free or "ability to pay"
repayment obligations.149 The scale of federal projects also became
larger than originally envisioned, and in states such as California sub-
stantial blocks of water were delivered to "excess" lands.
The Supreme Court's reclamation jurisprudence has evolved
through three phases: (1) the denial of federal power; (2) the confir-
mation of federal power and the displacement of state law; and (3) a
presumption of state supremacy. The constitutionality of the Recla-
mation Act of 1902 arose indirectly in the Supreme Court's first equi-
table apportionment case when the federal government petitioned to
intervene and urged the Court to adopt a uniform rule of prior appro-
priation. 5 ° The Court dismissed the petition, finding that the federal
government had no such power because reclamation of arid lands was
not among the enumerated powers of the Constitution.'15 Federal
power expanded dramatically during the New Deal when the Court
adopted a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. This expan-
sion led to the conclusion that the federal government need no
longer rely on the fiction of navigation improvement to allocate water.
In 1950, the Supreme Court held that the spending power of Con-
gress authorized federal reclamation projects. 15 2
Prior to 1958, reclamation law was premised on the assumption
that the federal government was simply a carrier and distributer of
project water and thus had to acquire all water rights needed for a
146. Id. § 3, 32 Stat. 389.
147. FREDERICK MERK, HISTORY OF THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT 511 (1978).
148. RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 29-30 (1989).
149. Id. at 33.
150. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
151. Id. at 87-100.
152. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
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federal project pursuant to state law.'53 The Bureau of Reclamation
held these rights in trust for project beneficiaries and had to operate
any project in conformity with state laws.'M Federal law did not dis-
place state law until a seminal 1958 decision arising out of California's
fierce resistance to the Reclamation Act of 1958.'15 To maintain deliv-
eries to excess lands, farmers in California convinced the state
supreme court that the excess lands provision of the Reclamation Act
of 1902 violated state law. 156 This was a dubious conclusion and, even
if correct, federal law nevertheless controls because section 5 of the
Reclamation Act clearly and unequivocally imposes a federal policy on
the delivery of water to project beneficiaries. 57 Section 8 was never
intended to repeal this express federal policy, and the Supreme Court
held that federal law supersedes state law. 158 The Court went beyond
this simple holding, however, and characterized section 8 as merely a
just compensation rule.' 59 The Bureau of Reclamation merely had to
follow state law to determine the amount of money due if it interfered
with any vested state rights.16°
This new reading of section 8 became the new reclamation law.
Five years later, the Supreme Court held that a California law recog-
nizing a preference for areas of origin-a biodiversity protection strat-
egy-was preempted by the Reclamation Act, although, unlike the
160 acre limitation, there was no clear conflict between federal policy
and state law.16' The Court reaffirmed its earlier dictum that state law
served only to define the "property interests, if any, for which compen-
sation must be made."162
The presumption that a broader and exclusive sphere was neces-
sary to carry out federal objectives was reversed in 1978, and reclama-
tion law was restored to the original intent of Congress. In California
v. United States, 6' the Supreme Court held that state law controls the
operation of federal reclamation projects unless it conflicts with an
explicit congressional directive. 1" Ironically, the opinion allowed
153. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614-16 (1945).
154. Id.
155. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
156. Id. at 287-89.
157. See id. at 291.
158. Id. at 294-300.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
162. Id. at 630.
163. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
164. Id. at 674-75. The basic conflict in the case was whether the State of California
could impose releases to support downstream white water rafting until the federal govern-
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California temporarily to block the filling of a federal reservoir to pre-
serve a stretch of white water below the dam.'6 5
2. FERC.-The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
the successor to the Federal Power Commission, is subject to a statute
which protects state water law from federal interference. However,
state concerns, which have often included biodiversity protection,
have until recently been ignored. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that a FERC license preempts contradictory state laws, with
the result that biodiversity has been subordinated to hydroelectric
power in many cases.1 66 FERC has both the power to issue or deny
licenses for hydroelectric projects on navigable streams 16 7-which are
the ones best adapted to the comprehensive development of the
river-and the authority to decommission dams.
In 1946, the Supreme Court addressed the relationship between
state law and the Federal Power Act. The state of Iowa wanted to en-
force a law limiting diversions to the watershed of origin, a biodiversity
protection rule. 168 The Supreme Court read section 27 of the Federal
Power Act to require deference to state law only for the purpose of
defining compensable water rights.'6 9 Any further deference to state
law would defeat the objective of the Act, which the Court erroneously
defined as "the comprehensive development of the water resources of
the Nation." 7 °
Congress began to limit FERC's authority in 1968 with the pas-
sage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 1 7 ' but the agency never fully
assimilated the message of the Act nor the change in water resources
policy that it signaled. 172 In the past thirty years, criticism of FERC's
environmental performance has mounted. The Court had a second
opportunity to check the power of FERC and promote biodiversity
protection as states began to impose minimum flow conditions on
ment could demonstrate that all water was needed to fulfill project purposes. California
prevailed on this ground. See United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152
(1946) (deferring to state law only in cases of compensable water rights).
167. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1988).
168. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop., 328 U.S. at 152; see Lynda Butler, Allocating Consumptive
Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Inter-
ests, 47 U. Prr. L. REv. 95, 111-17 (1985).
169. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop., 328 U.S. at 175-76.
170. Id. at 180.
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1271.
172. See Carolyn Ragensperger & A. Dan Tarlock, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act at 25:
The Need for a New Focus, 4 RvERS 81 (1993).
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FERC licenses under section 27. But in 1990, the Court reaffirmed
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative on stare decisis grounds and held
that California could not impose minimum flow license conditions on
the fiction that they interfered with FERC's comprehensive planning
authority.17
3
The states, however, have partially circumvented the wall of pre-
emption which shields FERC licenses from state regulation, again il-
lustrating the inconsistent protection which biodiversity receives
under federalism jurisprudence. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 74 requires that the appropriate state pollution authority must
certify under all federal permits and licenses that the proposed activity
will not interfere with state water quality standards.1 75 The scope of
section 401 has been controversial. Federal licensees and permittees
argue that the term is limited to point-source discharges, while states
have taken a much broader view of their authority. 176 In a rare deci-
sion reflecting sensitivity to biodiversity protection, the Supreme
Court agreed with the states and collapsed the "artificial distinction"
between quantity and quality regulation. In PUD No. I of Jefferson
County v. Washington Department of Fology,17 7 the Court held that sec-
tion 401 permits the state to impose minimum flow conditions on a
FERC licensee for a project on the Dosewallips River (located at the
edge of Olympic National Park), which was classified as "extraordi-
nary" under the state's anti-degradation standards. 171 Section 401 (d)
gives states the authority to condition approval on compliance with
state effluent limitations, water quality standards, and with "other ap-
propriate requirements of state law."179 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority of the Court, found that the minimum flow requirements
were proper because they were imposed to ensure compliance with
water quality use designations and anti-degradation standards, author-
ized by section 303 of the Clean Water Act'8 ° and because they were
adopted to preserve a designated use-salmon and trout runs.
181
173. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 496-506 (1990).
174. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)
[hereinafter CWA].
175. CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
176. See, e.g., Arnold Irrigation Dist. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 717 P.2d 1274,
1277-78 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that state may consider only those factors listed in
the Clean Water Act in their decisions on permit and license applications), cert. denied, 726
P.2d 377 (Or. 1987).
177. 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994).
178. Id. at 1914.
179. Id. at 1910.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
181. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 114 S. CL at 1909.
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FERC argued that section 303 required states to adopt water quality
standards with numeric rather than narrative criteria as a prerequisite
to invoking section 401.182 The Court disagreed and held that water
quality standards have two components, the designated use and the
criteria based on water quality. The Court explained that "EPA has
not interpreted § 303 to require the States to protect designated uses
exclusively through enforcement of numerical criteria."183
E. The Solutions Exceed the Effective Reach of Federal Power
Classic federalism doctrines are rapidly becoming irrelevant as all
levels of government move from a single media or species approach to
cooperative ecosystem approaches to biodiversity management.
Ecosystem management is creating a paradox in federal-state rela-
tions: the achievement of effective biodiversity protection efforts re-
lies on unexercised rather than exercised federal power. Ecosystem
management's collapse of conventional boundaries and the integra-
tion of public and private lands in a single functional unit makes local
rather than state governments much more important, especially for
land-use issues. As a result, the importance of the science of conserva-
tion biology is magnified. Science is the source of both substantive
management principles, such as the dedication of viable patches of
habitat linked by biological corridors,' 8 4 and the possibility for con-
sensus. For example, adaptive management is now seen as the pri-
mary strategy because it increases the possibility for consensus and
makes possible the creation of processes with self-correction mecha-
nisms.1 85 The net result is that the search for a permanent exclusive
regulatory authority-the essence of federalism jurisprudence-is
counterproductive. National standards are replaced by "place-driven"
182. Id. at 1910.
183. Id. at 1911.
184. See Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea, But What Is It, W'll It
Work, and Who Will Pay., 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (1995); Note, Saving an Endangered
Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CAsE W. REs. L. REv.
553 (1995).
185. A recent National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences study captures
the essence of adaptive management:
Adaptive planning and management involve a decision making process based on
trial, monitoring, and feedback. Rather than developing a fixed goal and an in-
flexible plan to achieve the goal, adaptive management recognizes the imperfect
knowledge of interdependencies existing within and among natural and social
systems, which requires plans to be modified as technical knowledge improves
COMMITrEE ON AQUATIC ECossmMs, supra note 11, at 357.
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ones 186 in which cooperation requires the subordination rather than
the exercise of federal authority.
Biodiversity protection experiments driven by the Endangered
Species Act illustrate the paradox which is a result of the historical
refusal to delegate land-use and water allocation authority to the na-
tional government. The exercise of preemptive power is difficult if
not impossible to sustain because the success of these experiments de-
pends on state and local cooperation. In recent years, however, the
federal government has asserted the authority to preempt state land
and water laws to protect endangered species and prevent water pollu-
tion.1 87 Ultimately, the federal government has had to defer to state
and local governments and rely on loosely structured cooperative
partnership agreements to achieve these objectives.'
The recent agreement between the federal government and the
state of California (styled "Club Fed") to manage the San Francisco
Bay-Delta illustrates the structural, as well as political limits of federal
authority. For over fifty years, California has been studying the impact
of diversions on the fresh-to-salt water balance in the Delta but de-
clined to address the problem because it would threaten the contin-
ued enjoyment of vested water rights."8 9 The issue came to a head in
1986 when an intermediate California appellate court held that state
law requires the integration of water quality and quantity allocation,
in essence that the Delta cannot be allowed to deteriorate.190 State
efforts to augment Delta flows had been initially blocked by San Joa-
quin and Southern California water users. In the early 1990s, the fed-
eral government threatened to "run" the Delta under the Clean Water
186. Thomas W.Jackson &Joshua S. Wyner, The New Hot Doctrine: Ecosystem Management,
NAT'L LJ., Dec. 5, 1994, at C6. In a more general survey of environmental federalism,
Professor Breckenridge reaches the same conclusion. Lee P. Breckenridge, Fractal Federal-
ism: Evolving National-State Relations in US. Environmental Law, in GOVERNMENT STRUcruREs
IN THE U.SA AND FORMER U.S.S.R. ch. 6 (James E. Hickey & Alexej Ugrinksy eds., forth-
coming 1996).
187. The takings issues raised by the Act are discussed in Note, Does Lucas Provide a
Takings Action Against Federal Regulation Under the Endangered Species Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.
1217 (1993). Both the Endangered Species Act and § 404 of the Clean Water Act create
regulatory water rights. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp.
1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992); A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 728-48
(1993).
188. For the most extensive theoretical discussion of the tension between local and na-
tional biodiversity control and the new forms of cooperative management that are emerg-
ing in this area, see Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional
Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Owmership, 19 VT. L. REv. 363 (1995).
189. SeeJOSEPH L. SAx ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 590-96 (1991).
190. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 179-80 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
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and Endangered Species Acts by setting water quality standards and
listing species. However, in 1994 the federal government and the
state reached a framework agreement on the principles for the future
management of the Delta.191
The agreement commits the federal government and the state to
a long-term cooperative management experiment within the context
of state water law and existing federal environmental protection man-
dates.1 92 Its success depends on the establishment of long-term coop-
eration between state and federal agencies and on the ability of both
sides to develop ecosystem management strategies based on sound,
continuously acquired scientific information. The strategies must pro-
vide adequate environmental flows within existing water entitlement
allocations and permit a more flexible interpretation of federal law.
Cooperation rather than preemption is required, moreover, to
assemble the necessary financial resources. The agreement was facili-
tated by three factors: (1) the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act of 1992 (CVPIA);' 93 (2) the policy of Secretary of the Interior Bab-
bitt to seek cooperative federal-state ecosystem management strategies
to achieve the objectives of the Endangered Species Act and other
federal environmental mandates without imposing undue burdens on
existing property right holders;194 and (3) the willingness of the Met-
ropolitan Water District of Southern California to guarantee a three-
year $10 million annual commitment for non-flow strategies such as
improved fish screens.1 95 The CVPIA enabled the federal government
to shoulder the major burden of meeting Delta water quality de-
mands. All Central Valley Project water will be credited against an 800
acre foot block dedicated in 1992, with any additional water needs
met through the purchase of existing entitlements. 96 Thus, Califor-
nia avoided-at least for the foreseeable future-quantifying and cur-
tailing a large portion of the state's water rights, although the state
must "immediately thereafter initiate water right proceedings to im-
plement the adopted plan." 97 For example, by 1998, the state must
191. For a detailed discussion of the principles, see A. DAN TARLOcK, LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5.19[8] (1995 Release).
192. Id.
193. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA), Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat.
4707 (1992).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 208-210.
195. TARLOCK, supra note 191, § 5.19[8].
196. Id.
197. Id.
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allocate the responsibility among water right holders in the San Joa-
quin basin for seasonable flows to protect Chinook Salmon.1 98
The Clinton administration has recently negotiated several simi-
lar agreements to resolve bitter land-use disputes that have arisen
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Federal land-use authority
comes from section 9 of the Act which makes any "taking" on private
or public land a violation of the Act. 9 Section 9 has threatened to
block residential development in areas where endangered species live,
unless developers and local governments agree to federal Habitat
Conservation Plans.20 The ESA gives the federal government the
power to preempt state and local land-use controls when a listed spe-
cies is potentially present within the jurisdiction, but the Department
of Interior has shifted to the use of special listing rules under section
4(d)."1 This section allows the Department to list a species as
threatened but to use state or local land-use authority as the protec-
tion mechanism.202
To resolve an especially protracted dispute in the Hill Country
around Austin, Texas after the county voted down a bond issue in
1995 to finance habitat acquisition,20 3 Secretary Babbitt agreed to
open land to development under a plan which creates marketable mit-
igation certificates to finance a 30,000 acre habitat reserve for two
songbirds and six cave bugs. 0 4 Developers may purchase "Participa-
198. The crux of the agreement is a seasonable Delta water export cap tied to the run-
off of an eight river index. The agreement expresses the hope that no new species will be
listed until 1998 and that "[c] ompliance with the take provisions of the biological opinions
under the Federal . . .ESA is intended to result in no additional loss of water supply
annually within the limits of the water quality and operational requirements of these Prin-
ciples." If additional species are listed for "unforeseen circumstances," no additional Delta
flows will be required. Id. Such state-local-federal ongoing multi-species protection part-
nerships dramatically illustrate the emergence of a new federalism model which is gradu-
ally replacing the threat of preemption with the promise of estoppel.
199. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. Taking has been defined to include habitat destruction, 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995), and the Secretary's interpretation of the statute has been upheld by
the Supreme Court. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Greater Oregon,
63 U.S.L.W. 4665 (U.S. June 29, 1995).
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
201. Id. § 1533(d).
202. The Department of Interior has proposed a complex 4(d) rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 9484
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. Pt. 17) (proposed Feb. 17, 1995), to protect the spotted owl on
non-federal lands in California and Washington state and to lift the blanket prohibitions
against "takes" imposed by federal injunctions. For a concise summary of the controversy
and the litigation that led to the proposed 4(d) rule, see COGGiNS ET AL., supra note 115, at
827-32.
203. See Ruhl, supra note 17.
204. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BALCONES CANYONLANDS CONSERVATION PLAN (BCCP):
SHARED VISION 1 (1995) (draft version).
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tion Fee Certificates" from governments who have contributed land or
funds to a reserve program to mitigate capital improvements. 20 5 The
hope is that the $2750 to $5500 per acre cost of the certificates will be
cheaper than the $9000 per acre that has historically been spent on
mitigation in the Balcones Canyonlands. Landowner participation is
voluntary,20 6 the details on local government implementation are "in
process,"2 17 and the long-term likelihood of success is not high.
The net result of these experiments is an attempt to encourage
partnership federalism. In contrast to previous models of cooperative
federalism, partnership federalism, which allows states and local gov-
ernments to define the content of federal mandates, is increasingly
characterized by federal waivers of power rather than preemption.
For example, to encourage cities to develop multi-species land-use
plans and regulatory programs, the Department of Interior an-
nounced an Assurances Policy in 1994.20' The policy, popularly
known as the "no surprises" policy, goes to the limits of the basic con-
stitutional doctrine that the sovereign cannot contract away the police
power209 by promising that once a Habitat Conservation Plan is ap-
proved, no new reserve dedications or other mitigation measures will
be allowed except in "extraordinary circumstances." 210 This policy, if
upheld, should, along with other incentives, encourage more public
and private participation in multiple species protection plans because
local land-use plans define the substantive protection mandates. Part-
nership federalism still rests on latent federal supremacy, but as a re-
cent evaluation of a similar California program, that seeks to promote
voluntary public and private biodiversity conservation programs,
concludes:
In order for this approach to work, the threat of an endan-
gered or threatened species listing must be close enough to
motivate landowners to participate in a voluntary effort to
205. Id.
206. Individual landowners may still seek section 10(a) permits.
207. On February 7, 1995, the Texas Capital Area Builders Association withdrew from
the task force studying the plan because they hope to repeal or substantially weaken the
ESA. Amy Smith, AUSTIN BUSINESS J., Feb. 10, 1995, § 1, at 1. See generaly TIMOTHY
BEATLEY, HABITAT CONVERSATION PlANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND URBAN GROWTH
(1994).
208. U.S. DEP'TS OF INTERIOR AND COMMERCE, ASSURING CERTAINTY FOR PRIVATE LAND-
OWNERS IN ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING (1994) (Joint State-
ment of Secretaries of Interior and Commerce) [hereinafter ASSURING PRIVATE
LANDOWNERS].
209. The doctrine rests of the principle that the federal government cannot be estopped
to exercise the police power. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
210. ASSURING PRIVATE LANDOWNERS, supra note 208.
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conserve habitat, but not so close that species might actually
be listed before the voluntary program can get off the
ground ..... 1
The limited ability of the federal government to protect biodiver-
sity both on its own public lands and on private property has forced
the federal government to induce state and local cooperation to im-
plement national objectives. A more functional and less abstract con-
cept of federalism can support this experiment. Courts can
encourage state and local biodiversity initiatives that do not conflict
with congressional policies by sanctioning constitutionally-supported
national biodiversity protection responses.
211. Jon Welner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning. An Ecosystem Approach to Pro-
tectingEndangered Species, 46 STAN. L REv. 319, 346 (1995). Professor Breckenridge's study
of the Northern Forest Lands Council, a six-year U.S. Forest Service exploration of ecosys-
tem management in upper New York State and northern New England, reached a similar
conclusion. "Partnerships for managing ecosystems are best seen as attempts to develop
new hybrid forms of decision-making, a 'third way,' that is decentralized and 'private'
enough to allow diverse, semi-autonomous action, but at the same time centralized and
'public' enough to achieve coordination on a region-wide basis." Breckenridge, supra note
186, at 409.
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